What it was called "the anthropology of music" finds its roots in two founding papers: The Anthropology of Music by Alan Merriam (1964) and How Musical is Man? by John Blacking (1973). In these two books, the musical structures are designed as a product of the culture. The methodological consequence is: the ethnomusicological investigation should begin from the study of the cultural context. The consequence of this position, quite widely used in the field, was to emphasize the music environment, rather than analyse its structure, with a few notable exceptions (the work of Simha Arom and his team). A fortiori, the research of universals, considered ethnocentric, was regarded in the field as inadmissible. After having proposed a setting up of this situation, the author examines the manner in which the issue of Blacking approaches the link between culture and musical structures, then reconsiders his positions with regard to universals, and possible biological foundations of music. The article ends with a plea for reconciliation, with a view to the ethnomusicology of tomorrow, from the point of view of the anthropology, taking into account the cultural determinations, the comparative study of the musical structures, and the search for universal
It might seem surprising to have written this paper in the context of an hommage to John Blacking, one of the leading figures of the anthropological approach to music, since I have long been considered a structuralist or formalist, as one who leaves by the wayside the cultural dimension of the music studied by ethnomusicology. In point of fact, I have never ceased to reflect on the relationship between music and culture, and as such, Blacking's book, How Musical is Man (Blacking, 1973) , has always been useful to me, perhaps not as a reference book whose orientation had to be adopted to the letter, but rather as a constant subject of reflection and discussion. It is no doubt for this reason that I did not hesitate, when the possibility arose, to have it published in French (Blacking, 1980 ). What's more, one may found in Blacking's writings contain some positions which are a direct or indirect response to my own (cf. Blacking, 1995, chap. V) . It might then seem like a provocation on my part, or worse, to present a paper on the subject of universals that pays tribute to someone who wrote the following: "Unless the formal analysis begins as an analysis of the social situation that generates the music, it is meaningless" (Blacking, 1973: 71) .
This methodological proposition was an extension of Alan Merriam's, which is the basis of the anthropological approach to music:
Music is a product of man and has structure, but its structure cannot have an existence of its own divorced from the behavior which produces it. In order to understand why a music structure exists as it does, we must also understand how and why the behavior which produces it is as it is, and how and why the concepts which underlie that behavior are ordered in such a way as to produce the particularly desired form of organized sound. (Merriam, 1964: 7) Why, under these conditions, would an ethnomusicologist be interested in universals?
Throughout the twentieth century, there has been no shortage of arguments against the very idea of searching for universals. Here is a shortlist of them, which I owe to my friend and colleague Jean Molino, with whom I have written an article precisely on the subject of universals (Molino-Nattiez, 2007) .
How can anyone make a claim to have discovered universals when no one has or will ever have complete, detailed knowledge of the fivethousand-odd distinct musical cultures known to exist today? Isn't it obvious that each time that we make an attempt at formulating a universal trait, a counterexample will pop up somewhere? Moreover, as Merriam states in the passage that I just read, since any particular music is the product of a specific culture, what use is it to look for universals in order to understand it? What's more, when we examine the lists of universals compiled by certain researchers, it dawns on us that we could just as easily have found them in verbal language, narrative or theatre. How are they then going to help us to understand the musical phenomenon? Lastly, how can we speak of universals in music when it is not certain that what we, as Westerners, call music is a universal phenomenon? This reminds me of an observation that Kenneth Gourlay made. Quoting a Nigerian musicologist about Igbo culture who stated that the "concept of music nkwa combines singing, playing musical instruments and dancing into one act" (Nwachukwu, 1981: 59) , Gourlay exclaims ironically: "How different things would have happened if the Igbo tongue had attained the same 'universality' as English!" (1984: 35) And this same Gourlay goes on to plead for the "the Non-Universality of Music and the Universality of Non-Music"! There's no way to look for universals in "music" when ninety percent of the world's cultures do not even have a word for "music"! The quest for universals is apparently one of the most common and most perverse manifestations of ethnocentrism. For all of these reasons, "musics" are apparently incommensurable, and the search for universals, a politically incorrect lost cause. * Allow me to confess that I am not convinced by any of these arguments. And paradoxically, it is the work and thought of John Blacking which reassures me in my opinion. I would like to offer here, as a way to begin, a kind of posthumous dialogue with him. Let's consider first of all the title of his most famous book. When he asks, "How Musical is Man?", is he not trying to find how it is that all human beings are potentially musical? Of course, we know his answer expressed in 1971 to this question, which is that of a 'social anthropologist': "My theme is that music expresses aspects of the experience of individuals in society" (Blacking, 1995: 32) .
One then has the urge to find out just which aspects of music are explained through their links to culture in the work of John Blacking, through the use of various methods which I won't go into here. I would say that there are essentially three of them. First of all, those aspects situated on the level of the meta-language: the terminology of genres according to socio-religious categories, the titles of the pieces and the vernacular categories used to designate certain aspects of the music. Secondly, Black-ing also lists aspects which, although not having to do with the sounds themselves, are still fundamental, culturally speaking, to the explanation of the form which any give music takes: instrumental techniques, metrical beats, counting (in the specific genre of the counting song or 'comptine'), the speech intonation in cultures which use languages with tones, and the influence of words. Lastly, the link between music and culture is established on the level of what he terms, alluding explicitly to Chomsky, 'deep', or underlying structures, structures which are of a social nature, because "the function of music is to reinforce, or relate people more closely to, certain experiences which have to come to have meaning in their social life." (Chomsky, 1973: 99 ) These three families of ties between music and culture demonstrate right from the start that not all aspects of music are explained by culture. Let take the example of musical scales. It goes without saying that Blacking does not neglect them, but what he focuses on, in terms of cultural explanation, was the reasons why one social group borrowed a given scale from another, rather than examining the reasons for its particular form or structure."The selection and use of scales may be the product of social and cultural processes that are not necessarily related to the acoustical properties of sound" (Blacking, 1973: 73) .
And then he goes on to criticize Max Weber, who "rationalized the European musical system from within the tone system" (Blacking, 1973: 73) .
Another question immediately springs to mind: Can the sum total of all aspects of the music of a particular group be explained by its social underpinnings? Consider a single example. In Venda Children's Songs, Blacking brilliantly noted that twenty-six of the children's songs derived from the pattern of the tsikona, the national dance of the Venda, but he goes on to generalize his observation: "The thematic relationships express the relationships of the social groups who make the music, particularly with regard to the overriding concept of Venda solidarity" (Blacking 1967: 196) .
If we examine this book closely, we see that, in fact, only twenty-six of the songs are related to the national dance, out of a total of fifty-nine that he recorded and transcribed: twenty-one others come from the pentatonic schemas of "reed-pipe music", and twelve derive from scales or modes of which several are taken from songs for adults which are distinct from the national dance (Blacking, 1967: 194, 195) . Given this, is it possible to maintain, as he does in How Musical is Man?, that "The thematic relationships of tsikona and the Venda children's songs express corresponding social relationships"? (Blacking, 1973: 101) .
This position, at once deterministic and functionalist, is the strength as well as the key to the success of Blacking's work. I just explained, however, why this position fails to convince me. But I would go so far as to say that Blacking himself sensed the difficulties inherent to his position. In order to prepare for this paper, I re-read his three books, and although I didn't go through all 191 of his published papers (cf. his list of works in Blacking, 1995: 247-252) , I did go through those collected in Music, Culture, and Experience (1995) , and a few others as well. I was struck by two things. First, from his very first important texts, Blacking explicitly recognizes the existence of universals. I consider it highly symbolic that his last two papers, published after his death, deal with what he calls "The Biology of Music-Making". The first was published in Italy thanks to the efforts of Raffaelle Pozzi (Blacking, 1990) in the collected papers from a conference on the perennial problem of "la musica come linguaggio universale"; the second is accessible in an ethnomusicological handbook edited by Helen Myers (Blacking, 1992) . The evolution of Blacking's work seems to me to parallel in every way that of Alan Merriam, who, also in his last article, published after his untimely death, firmly rehabilitated the comparative approach in ethnomusicology, in a text entitled "On Objections to Comparison in Ethnomusicology" (1982) .
My purpose is to remind us that structural studies clearly do have their place in ethnomusicology, that such studies lead naturally and inevitably to comparisons of structures, and that such comparisons can, under specific circumstances, lead to new and broadened knowledge of music. (Merriam, 1982: 175) In truth, there's nothing surprising about the fact that the two scholars who contributed the most to focussing ethnomusicological research towards the specificity of cultures both ended up returning to research topics which their general viewpoints helped to shun, because it is impossible, in any scientific activity, to at once embrace a deterministic as well as a reductionistic point of view. I would like then, first of all, to examine a certain number of Blacking's statements which seem to demonstrate the need for the ethnomusicologist to be concerned about universals and to set out to find them. * Blacking's interest in universals is in fact derived from his vision of music as a force of social cohesion. For this reason, in the period leading up to How musical is man?, pre-1973, the contribution of communication to societal cohesion occupies a non-negligible place in his approach, as can be seen in the first chapter of Music, Culture, and Experience (1995) , which dates from 1971. In order for there to be communication between human beings, not only within a culture, but also between different cultures -and this preoccupation remains present in all of his writings -there must be musical universals. In an article entitled "Can Musical Universals Be Heard?", which was written in 1977, he reflects on what he considers to be the universality of the British composer Elgar's musical message. In so doing, he was revisiting a problem which he had put forward in a more timid form in How musical is man?, when he stated that: "Perhaps there is a hope of cross-cultural understanding after all " (1973: 111) Four years later, he writes: "The conviction that music can transform experience, heighten consciousness, induce ecstasy, or even cure sickness, is perhaps universally held, and is a stimulus to countless musical performances. " (1977: 14, 16 ). However, he adds that
The power of music is due not only to its acoustical properties, but also to the social experience that its performance generates, in creating a quasi-ritual association and concentration of human bodies in time and space. (…) If people are turned on by either music or a social situation, what happens to them is possible only through some kind of spontaneous collective awareness, which has not been, and cannot easily be, proved." (1977: 16) The possibility of this special kind of communication [i.e., the musical and the social] is in fact the only real basis for a useful theory of musical universals. If human beings can never share feelings, the discovery of universal musical traits would not reveal much about the nature of music" (1977: 16-18) Therefore, the potentially universal traits of music can only be considered as such by taking into account their expressive dimension, on condi-tion that we consider only those connotations which are shared not just by a single community, but transculturally. In his last essay, which, as it happens, does not figure in the bibliography of his writings (1990: 247-252) , and which is significantly entitled "Transcultural Communication and the Biological Foundations of Music", he states that:
Transcultural communication is possible not because of the ways in which individuals make sense of it. The only area in which significant universals may be found is the biological foundations of music-making, the cognitive and affective processes by which people make sense of musical sound . (1990: 180) In reality, this position is not surprising, since, even though Blacking worked so hard, on the heels of Merriam, to get us to study the specificity of each musical culture, he never lost sight of the fact that every individual belongs to the universal community of all human beings, and he hoped that music would contribute to the development of a sense of human brotherhood. Let me remind of the moving final paragraph of How musical is man?:
In a world such as ours, in this world of cruelty and exploitation in which the tawdry and the mediocre are proliferated endlessly for the sake of financial profit, it is necessary to understand why a madrigal by Gesualdo or a Bach Passion, a sitar melody from India or a song from Africa, Berg's Wozzeck or Britten's Requiem, a Balinese gamelan or a Cantonese opera, or a symphony by Mozart, Beethoven, or Mahler, may be profoundly necessary for human survival. (Blacking, 1973: 116) The consequences of these affirmations are strong because they lead us to advance the idea that there must exist emotional or affective universals in music, and an identical emotional response to a given music, within a culture as well as from one culture to the next. If indeed a universal dimension exists, it must not depend on any particular social or cultural conventions, or on the idiosyncrasies of individuals. How then can we find a basis for the existence of these universals? Blacking's statement on this point are radical. I quote an article from 1977:
Musicians reared in mutually incomprehensible cultural traditions may use a common device which, because it is based on a universal mental structure, may resonate with listeners unfamiliar with the cultural or musical idiom. To do this, they must reach beyond the conventions of their particular society to the universal mental processes of the species.(…) This is how the most individual composer can have the most universal appeal : he communicates to others at the level of the innate ; he begins with cultural conventions, but transcends them by reorganizing his sound structures in a personal, but basically universal, way, rather than slavishly following culturally given rules. (Blacking, 1977: 19) What Blacking is admitting here is the existence of identical processes among all humans, which are at work whatever the cultural context, and which underlie different musical phenomena. This leads him to ask the following two questions: "What innate capabilities, if any, are commonly required for all known traditions of music-making? And which of these are peculiar to only certain traditions?" (ibid., 21; my emphasis).
In every culture we can observe the existence of what he calls in his article "Towards a Theory of Musical Competence", inspired by Chomsky, "musical ability", that is, every culture puts into practice "musical competence as composer or performer, or both, but most particularly as listener " (1971: 21) . This ability depends at the same time on individual musical competence and on universal musical competence. By this, he means "the innate or learned capacity to hear and create patterns of sound which may be recognized as music in all cultural traditions." (ibid., 21).
And by "music", Blacking means "the patterns of humanly organized sound" (ibid., 24), an expression which he subsequently used in his most famous book. Also, "it is not unreasonable to suppose that most men could acquire particular musical competence under favourable cultural conditions, and that all may be born with certain capacities which constitute universal competence." (ibid., 24)
The result?
Suppose we look at the social, musical, economic, legal, and other subsystems of a culture as transformations of basic structures that are in the body, innate in man, part of his biological equipment.
[…] The following relationships may be transformations of a single structure: call/response, tone/companion tone, tonic/countertonic, individual/community, chief/subjects, theme/variation, male/female".
[…] There seem to be universal structural principles in music, such as the use of mirror forms, theme and variation, repetition, and binary form. (Blacking, 1973: 112) If we compare this last quote with what he said about "innate capabilities", we are led to posit a distinction, even if it is not brought out by Blacking himself, between two possible types of universals: those which Jean Molino calls universals of strategy and universals of substance. The universals of strategy are cognitive in nature, and it is these which Blacking will appeal to when he asserts the legitimacy of searching for universals. The universals of substance are found in characteristics inscribed in the musical material itself, that are constant from one culture to the next, such as a certain aspect of the musical form or of a particular rhythm. We will return to these later on.
Of course, being the social anthropologist that he is, Blacking placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that, for him, each culture draws on the natural givens in order to construct their own musical system, rather than claiming that the culture obeys the dictates of nature. But without positing a universal musical competence, he writes that "we cannot expect different musical systems to be mutually intelligible " (1971: 33) , and his main preoccupation in this text of 1971 is in fact the possibility of transcultural communication:
There is evidence, he adds, that the deep structures of music may be influenced by intellectual and interactional processes which are as fundamental to the nature of every man as are certain cultural processes to particular groups of men, and it is at this level of analysis that we must look for the facts which will lead us towards a theory of universal musical competence. (1971: 33) What is particularly interesting about this formulation is that Blacking draws a parallel between the cognitive and the social foundations of this intercommunication. This explains why, already in the preface to How musical is man?, Blacking speaks of "the biological and social origins of music" (1973: xi, my emphasis). "Essential physiological and cognitive processes that generate musical composition and performance may even be genetically inherited, and therefore present in almost every human being. " (1973: 7) .
Biology is a recurring theme of the book as a whole, placed on the same footing as culture as a foundation of music. I found no less than fourteen occurrences of the word 'biological' and references to innatism in How Musical is Man?. Also, in the final pages, after having reaffirmed that "some of the processes that generate [the musical systems] may be innate in all men and so species-specific" (1973: 115), Blacking expresses the hope that ethnomusicology would allow us to "learn more about the inner nature of man 's mind" (1973: 115) . In his final paper, he adheres to the idea of "the psychic unity of mankind" (1992: 301), and I quote again from How Musical is Man?:
At some level of analysis, all musical behavior is structured, whether in relation to biological, psychological, sociological, cultural, or purely musical processes; and it is the task of the ethnomusicologist to identify all processes that are relevant to an explanation of musical sound. (1973: 17) In the remainder of this paper I will examine the consequences of the task which John Blacking has assigned to us. * I believe that ethnomusicology today could benefit from two broad mutations which, among other fields, have affected musicology in general since the publication of How Musical is Man?, forty years ago. First of all, music analysis has seen some new developments. In the years up to nineteen-seventy-three, Blacking's analytical references were essentially Adler, Sachs, Réti, Deryck Cooke and some statistical number-crunchers. Thanks to Leonard Meyer's Explaining Music in particular, which was also published in 1973, theorists became aware that a musical piece is made up of parameters and constituent parts which, over the course of one and the same work, behave according to quasi-autonomous rules and functions. This is what I have called in some of my writings the parametric conception of music. The second mutation was the development of the cognitive psychology of music. These two mutations are not without links which connect them, and both greatly bear on the question of musical universals.
As I hope to have shown at the beginning of this paper by listing the aspects of the musical fact which Blacking explains by culture, not all aspects of music can be explained as a product of culture. In a book whose approach is unfortunately too positivist and formalist to have attracted much serious attention at the time of its publication, Jay Rahn supplied a nice reductio ad absurdum: "If culture caused music, one could dispense with studying music. " (1983:17) .
It is unfortunate that this is in fact what too many ethnomusicologists of anthropological orientation, and no doubt influenced by the radical determinism of Merriam, which is clear from the quotation which I cited at the beginning of this talk. And it is probably this same conviction, that music is a product of culture, which led Blacking to write that "music confirms what is already present in society and culture, and it adds nothing new except patterns of sound " (1973: 54) . This amounts to attributing a rather weak form of specificity to the musical fact, in comparison to other symbolic forms. Moreover, I would be tempted to complete Rahn's observation in the following way: if culture really produced music, we would be able to insert all the cultural data into a machine and generate music from it. Clearly, this has never been possible, and never will be. This is not the place to discuss Rahn's radical claim that "cultural values have been demonstrated to determine only a small, and relatively superficial portion of the musical observables in any given instance" (1983:19), even if a 'Merriamian' ethnomusicologist like Anthony Seeger has written that "most ethnomusicologists claim, somewhat as a matter of faith, that music is in some way related to the society that produces it" (1980: 8, my emphasis). Suffice it to say, and this should be acceptable to everyone, and Blacking, clearly would have agreed, that, given our present-day tools the aspects that the synchronic cultural context do not explain, must be explained by other means: by history, by influences and migrations, and also, no doubt, by human biological, neurological and psychological constants. By considering a musical piece as a hierarchical combinatorial system of parameters and aspects identified by analysis, we obtain the means to explain it, not in a reductive sense, but according to a web of influence or causality of which it is, on several different levels, the result. This network of causes includes the innate and universal musical competence about which Blacking speaks. But today, the appeal to competence is no longer only a theoretical project, or a mere programmatic proclamation, as it was in 1971. We understand it much better today, thanks to the work of the cognitivists.
To these two mutations, I would add a third, which I don't place on the same level as the others, because it would be at once pretentious and unrealistic to claim that my own work has had the same impact on musicology; in point of fact, I am following the fundamental tenets of Jean Molino, who in turn and in various ways, owes much to the legacy of Cassirer and Piaget. This factor is the need to consider music as a symbolic form with its own specific modes of operation.
Before I return to fleshing out Blacking's observation on universals, and to the compatibility of research into universals and the study of the cultural specificity of a musical repertoire, I would like to refute the five arguments against universals which I summarized at the beginning of this talk, and to confront them with a few arguments in favour of looking for them. To this end, I will draw on the two broad mutations of which I just spoke, and on the notion of a symbolic form.
I'll begin with the latter. Music is allegedly not a universal phenomenon because not all societies have a word for 'music'. This puts us on firmly nominalist terrain! Must all societies have the word 'religion' -which is far from being the case -if we are to claim that religious belief is a phenomenon present in all cultures? The truth of the matter is that music, just like myth, religion, narrative and language, is a specific symbolic form. As was noted above, Gourlay reports that, according to one Nigerian musicologist, the Igbo combine "singing, playing musical instruments and dancing into one act". In order to arrive at this, he had to consider song, instrumental practice and dance as autonomous forms of symbolic activity in and of themselves, and which, for the Igbo, merge together into a single entity, which is called nkwa. What's more, the semantic surface of the word nkwa is exactly the same as that of the ancient Greek "mousikè"! This didn't prevent Western science from defining a quasi-autonomous symbolic form, what we call 'music', and the same goes for the understanding of nkwa as a symbolic form having its own unity for the Igbo. Because in order to understand how they function, song, instrumental production and dance must be separated from each other; the reason for this is that each requires its own specific analytical tools, that is, simply put, a sound of singing voice is just not the same thing as a dance step, which has never discouraged an Igbo from considering that you can't do one without the other. One cannot adequately analyze an opera, in our society, without relating the music to the text; to do this, one is obliged at a given moment to distinguish between the organization of the musical material and that of the libretto.
This position obviously requires us to supply a universal definition of the musical fact, but, building on an old suggestion by Jean Molino, I feel comfortable with the following one: "Music is sound that is organized and recognized by a culture." Up to here, this is just as valid for music as it is for language. However, contrary to linguistic utterances, musical constructions do not aim at conveying messages whose semantic content are coordinated syntactically, because music is organized syntactically on the level of what music theory calls 'notes', the equivalent of phonemes, and not on the level of larger units such as motifs, the equivalents of the monemes which link signifiers to signifieds. If this is the case, and given that each culture possesses its own specific forms of musical organization -if we think of the calls of the muezzin, of Schönberg's Sprechgesang, of the throat games of Inuit women, of 'bel canto' opera -the musical fact is certainly a universal phenomenon: for this reason, the search for universals in music is totally legitimate.
The two objections according to which one could never be familiar with all the musical cultures of the world, and that, each time that we attempted to discern a universal trait, a counter-example would pop up somewhere, are no longer valid when we search for the universals in the cognitive strategies and processes which are the basis for the production and the perception of substantial aspects of music. I'm not saying that that's the only thing we have to do. I'm merely pointing out that if we succeed in identifying the universals of strategy, we can, in a second stage of research, not busy ourselves with the impossible task of taking stock of all of the world's musical cultures, but rather to verify if these universals of strategy are in fact at work behind any new musical culture which comes under our observation. In other words, following an inductive search for universals of strategy, we can proceed in a deductive manner. But in that case, we must take a closer look at the methodological path which we have taken, in order to work back from the observation of pieces and works, to the universals.
Leonard B. Meyer was already aware of the importance of universals of strategy in one of the first articles which was favorable to the search for universals, which was published in the journal Ethnomusicology in 1960. At that time, his text was not very influential because the only way that it could be fully understood was in light of Meyer's general theory, which he only developed subsequently in his books which were to follow. Over and above the specificity with which we register our descriptions of melodies, modes, rhythms, forms, etc., he claimed that there existed "more general laws governing all human behavior" (Meyer, 1971: 271) . Taking the example of melody, he wrote that it was comprised not only of a collection of particular sounds, but also "a set of subjectively felt tendencies among the tones" (1971: 271). "What we should ask," he wrote, "is whether, beneath the profusion of diverse and divergent particulars, there are any universal principles functioning." (ibid.; my emphasis).
Let's look at the example of melody, for which he laid out a remarkable analytical model in his book of 1973, Explaining Music, and which, for this reason, should be of great interest to ethnomusicologists.
Take for example the melodic profile of the scherzo from Bruckner's Seventh Symphony: it rises up from a low A, the tonic, all the way up to a high E in bar 6; but you have to wait until measure 252 for the melody to come back down to the initial low A (Meyer, 1973: 205) . Conversely, in many of the songs of the Baganda in Uganda, all high notes are immediately followed by a drop back down to the tonal center. In the music of North American Indians, melodies often have a descending profile, but tend to be much longer than their Baganda counterparts, and, obviously, a good deal shorter than Bruckner. These three examples of melodies have apparently nothing in common, except that, after a rise, they all display a descending profile. What Meyer brings out here is the existence of a universal principal which underlies these differences, and explains the melodic behaviour of each. At the heart of his analyses of melody, Meyer posits as a law, based on the principles of Gestalttheorie and recently re-examined by Fred Lerdahl (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983: 40-43, 302-307), a leading cognitivist musicologist and theorist, that any melody which rises, that is to say which is characterized at a given moment by a leap to a higher pitch , tends to come back down towards a moment of rest. This observation is based on the Gestalt principle known as the law of complementarity and closure: every time a musical event is initiated, it must find a satisfying conclusion, from a psychological point of view. But, three consequences of this analysis must be taken into account: 1) Firstly, the reason that it is possible, starting from three melodies (and in fact from more than that), to derive what appears to be a law of universal scope (a universal of strategy), is because we were able, with our tools, to find something which the three had in common. In short, whether explicitly or intuitively, we superimposed paradigmatically the music in such a way as to bring out the characteristics which recur from one culture to another. What we undertook then, is what I have always had the weakness for calling, following Molino's parlance, an analysis of the neutral level of the three melodies that were under consideration. We found that the succession 'rising/falling' is the common trait that they all share. This is the descriptive stage. It would then seem that universals of substance do in fact exist (and I could give a few examples of them, in particular those which have been patiently enumerated by Bruno Nettl in an article of 1977).
2) Secondly, tracking down these intercultural recurrences is in fact a necessary step towards discovering universals of strategy. But when we make explicit what is common to all of them, we are leaving the descriptive stage, and are moving onto the explanatory stage: if we accept the validity of the Gestaltist approach -and that's for psychologists to confirm (cf. Imberty, 1990: 118-122) -then the laws of complementarity and closure do in fact explain the profiles of the melodies which were empirically examined.
3) Thirdly, this whole process aims at rehabilitating the comparative perspective. If we move away from it, we are quite simply prohibiting ourselves from answering, on the level of sonic phenomena, the question: "How musical is man?". And I am happy to read the following lines which Merriam wrote shortly before his death: "It is virtually impossible to conceive of a type of study that does not use comparison (…). Even description is based upon implicit comparison. " (1982: 177) .
Typologies and comparisons are absolutely necessary if we are to better understand how music works. George List (1977: 44, 46 ) criticized the psychologist Dane Harwood for having presented the perception of discrete pitches as a universal trait (Harwood, 1976: 525) by pointing to societies in which, on the contrary, pitches are not discretized. List was right, but that only meant that we need to compile a typology of the different ways in which sound is used in different cultures, which would permit us to assimilate as music -because what reason would we have to exclude them? -Inuit throat games, the glissandi of the Formosans, the tumbling strains of which Sachs spoke, and electroacoustic music, but we would have to place them in a vast general category, distinct from those which rely on the discretization of pitches.
By taking the path of classification and typology, we offer a response to the other objections which have at times been used against the partisans of universals: the fact that certain universal traits are not to be found in all musics. Appealing to this argument is quite simply to forget that no culture is under any obligation to use all the possibilities which the neuropsychological apparatus offers it. In this perspective, it is legitimate to speak of 'quasi-universals', even if that expression might seem to be a contradiction in terms. On the contrary! It is inscribed in our bio-genetic code that human skin of all men and all women can have diverse forms of pigmentation. And yet not all human beings have white skin, nor do all have black skin.
In order to undertake classifications -those of the different ways in which sound is used which I have just evoked, have much to teach us about the nature of music -it is necessary to employ comparisons. Even when typological work is not the explicit aim of the researcher, intuitions about the nature of music in general are indispensable. To cite Leonard B. Meyer's brilliant formulation in his article from 1998 which, making full circle, he devotes to universals: "One cannot comprehend and explain the variability of human cultures unless one has some sense of the constancies involved in their shaping." (Meyer, 2000: 281) .
How in fact can we bring out the specificity of a musical culture if we don't have a general framework available to us which would allow us to precisely define it and to give it its full meaning by comparing it to others? It was clear just a moment ago, with reference to the three types of melodic behaviour, each quite distinct from the other, but having in common an underlying universal Gestaltist law.
But what I have just tried to demonstrate could provoke two objections.
As I said at the beginning of this article, certain opponents of the search for universals have not failed to note that many of the cognitive strategies advanced by those who do adhere to them, are not exclusive to the domain of music, and by this they are trying to make a negative point. In reality, they didn't understand that given that certain cognitive strategies are present in all human beings, there is no reason why these same strategies should not be at work behind other symbolic forms such as linguistic utterance or literary narrative. This observation has another consequence: it is no longer easy to assert that music is the exclusive domain of human beings. Since it is a phenomenon which is in part based in biology, there is no reason to think that we cannot find music among animals, as the socalled 'zoo-musicologists' have recently shown, and who have set up shop in the zoos of Berlin and Los Angeles. I won't get into this here, but I refer you first of all to an article by Peter Marler (2004) and to that fascinating book, The Origins of Music (Wallin et al., 2000) , which is a collection of talks given at a colloquium that was held in Fiesole. The quest for musical universals is legitimate because it allows us to better understand not only human beings, but also, all living things.
The second possible objection to my previous analysis, and it is also the most common objection against the search for universals, is that since music is a product of culture, different musical cultures are incommensurable. Because -not so fast -if you compare structures from culture to culture, while remaining only on the level of musical substance, you end up falling into the sort of ethnocentrism from which ethnomusicology has had so much trouble extricating itself since the nineteen-sixties! My intention is not at all to advocate a return to an ethnomusicology which ignores the crucial role played by taking the culture into account in the production, the perception and the comprehension of musical phenomena which are present in it. But I believe that, in order to see things clearly, we must distinguish between two types of links between the musical and the cultural.
Let me remind the crucial distinction between etic and emic points of view, as proposed by Kenneth Pike in 1954, and which has since penetrated into linguistics, certainly, but also anthropology and, consequently, into ethnomusicology. To put it simply, and without going into a complex exegesis of these two categories, the etic point of view is that of the researcher who is outside of the culture; the emic point of view corresponds to the cognitive categories, whether verbalized or not, of the local inhabitants.
For this reason, and this is obvious, a typology of universals -and I found at least eight in the musicological literature -, or any other attempt at comparison of data borrowed from different cultures is by its nature etic. This is the case for the universal classification of the structures of languages proposed by Claude Hagège (1982) . But his classification is all the more convincing for the fact that it bases itself on a sampling of 754 phonological descriptions, that is, emic descriptions. In comparison, ethnomusicology is far from its goal, and has fallen behind considerably: how can we fail to be surprised that the Garland Encyclopedia of World Music published so few studies of musical scales? Granted, in the first stages of comparative ethnomusicology, researchers based themselves on etic descriptions of scales and their comparisons were doomed to failure. But since then, now that the etic/emic distinction is available to us, it is possible, by using the model of phonology as inspiration, as was done with brio by a disciple of Pike's, Vida Chenoweth (1972 , 1979 , or by developing, in the field, techniques suitable to the investigation, to undertake an emic characterization of scales. Even if we had available to us only as few as a hundred odd descriptions obtained from methodological principles held constant, we could begin a classificatory comparison of scales. I would posit then that the comparative work which is the basis for the search for universals can be founded on emic characterizations of musical phenomena, established before hand: I am thinking here of the work of Simha Arom on African rhythm and meter, or on more recent work conducted by his research team on the musical scales of the Ouldémé and the Bedzan of Cameroon: their emic nature is proven through recourse to veritable experiments conducted in the field.
But we encounter a second case which has to do with the relationship between music and culture: it is illustrated by Blacking in a Neo-Marxist vein and consists in proposing a hermeneutics of musical production in a functionalist perspective. It is not the object of this article to discuss this aspect of the anthropology of music. All that I wish to do here is to distinguish between an emic characterization of the constituent aspects of a musical system, and a cultural interpretation of them.
A fine study by Nidaa Abou Mrad (2005) proves that, in the Arab world, certain choices of scales were made, in different eras, as a response to preoccupations about identity. This is what we could call an anthropological approach to scales. However, this approach is not sufficient in the explanation of a musical scale's structure and of how it is built up, and the strength of the author's argument comes from the fact that it is based on a detailed analysis of the different types of structures which are observable in the scales of the Arabic Orient. It's clear: emic description of scales and cultural interpretation of these phenomena are two distinct yet complementary aspects, of one and the same object. And here I would endorse the position of Alan Merriam, presented in his very last essay:
If we are to learn as much as possible, in the most economical way, about music taken as a socio-cultural phenomenon, then we cannot cut ourselves off from any reasonable approach. Lest there be misunderstanding, I wish to reiterate that ethnomusicology for me is the study of music as culture, and that does not preclude the study of form; indeed we cannot proceed without it. (1982: 18, my emphasis) And there is all the more need for these aspects to be distinguished since we often encounter musical universals which cannot be linked to the corresponding musical structures. I am thinking in particular of an observation which was put forward by David McAllester, in a symposium in 1970 devoted to our subject, and which made enough of an impression on those who heard it that it was later taken up again and discussed by several of his colleagues: "One of the most important of the universals, or nearuniversals, in music is that music transforms experience.(…) Music takes one away into another state of being " (1971: 380) . Now, it is, if not impossible, at the very least extremely difficult, in our present state of understanding, to establish a link of causality between a musical phenomenon and the transformation of consciousness that it provokes, but that doesn't change the fact that we encounter this phenomenon in practically all cultures. In the same vein, the work of Gilbert Rouget shows clearly that although we encounter the phenomenon of trance in Africa just as we find it at the Paris opera or in Sicily (Rouget, 1990: 434-447) , that does not mean that the link between music and trance is founded in a universal bi-univocal relationship. We are in the presence here of behaviors which are universally observable, related to music, but for which the only explanations accepted at present are of an anthropological or cultural character.
Lastly, there is a third case which is the opposite of the previous one: the one which says that we have the right to look for universals when the phenomena under examination cannot be explained through recourse to culture, for the simple reason that culture cannot explain everything about music. I will distinguish between two situations, depending on whether we're talking about universals of strategy or universals of substance.
There is first of all the case of such and such a universal of strategy which governs musical phenomena which are of a totally heterogeneous nature from a cultural point of view. There is a very simple, yet fundamental example of this: it lies in what we could call, if I can be forgiven for the pun, the 'faculty of music': the fact that, short of any coercive intervention by the State in places like Afghanistan or Iran, there is no culture without music, and there is one simple reason for this: as the psychologists remind us (Imberty, 2004) , when a baby is between two and six months old, we can distinguish between the sounds it makes for the purpose of communication, and which become verbal language, and others which are the product of play, notably those which make use of repetition, which as Gilbert Rouget (1990) has relevantly observed, is one of the universal traits of music.
After this, there follows the case of universals of substance which, once again, resist cultural explanation, and here, I would like to appeal to a decisive but little known argument in favor of universals by J.H. Kwabena Nketia, which appears in an article from 1984 where he speaks about socalled World Music, at a time when it was in its early stages.
The universality of music has been viewed from the perspective of the creative process which selects and integrates variants and invariants from different sources. What unifies music wherever it is found is believed to be its basic forms which presuppose the use of common resources and techniques. (Nkteia, 1984: 4) For creative musicians, the universals of music are the materials and processes of music capable of application or use outside particular societal or cultural boundaries, or capable of stimulating aesthetic response outside their original environment. The type and range of universals of music can expand as a result of the processes of interculturation, for what is common or basic everywhere is often not as exciting artistically as what is different and challenging but capable of being integrated into one's universe of experience. (Nkteia, 1984: 6, my underlying) Of course, this text should not be interpreted as a function of World Music as we know it today which is more often than not, synonymous with the hegemony of a certain industrial musical culture to the detriment of local musical ones. What is at issue here, on the one hand, is the possibility of musicians to enlarge their musical palettes by combining particular traits of different musical languages and styles, and on the other hand, the fact that the listener belonging to culture X can derive obvious satisfaction from listening to music which is born of a culture Y which is completely foreign to him or her. As we know since Brailoiu, aksak rhythms can be found in a great variety of world cultures, but also in the music of Dave Brubeck (in Take five) and in Ligeti's piano Études. Is it unreasonable to think that the listener, whatever culture he or she may belong to, will be conscience, through the use of analogous cognitive strategies, of the typical uneven beats of these limping rhythms? Isn't the presence of a great number of CDs devoted to traditional music in our music stores indicative of the possibility of intercultural understanding? What we have to bring out here is the notion of 'musical comprehension', and to distinguish it from linguistic comprehension. When I travel to Tokyo, I am not able to understand a single sentence that is spoken in Japanese. On the other hand, if I go to a concert of traditional Japanese music or to Nô theatre, this music 'speaks to me' on a certain level. Otherwise, not only would the sale of traditional music CDs in the West be inexplicable, but also the expansion of interest in World music today. If this is so, the reason is that, as the psychologist and musicologist Michel Imberty has aptly put it, "Tu peux décider de ne pas garder l'original français ou de mettre la traduction anglaise en note".
The interpretation which the listener chooses can sometimes go beyond his or her cultural sphere, and be enriched by interpretive items, which, because of the structure or the geographical or cultural provenance of the music, the listener did not respond to at first. Universality here lies in the way that the in-terpretive procedures at a given moment can allow one to produce, understand or discover certain structural similarities. (Imberty, 1990: 127) This obviously does not mean that we understand the sum total of whatever is connected to a specific musical universe. This is one aspect which Blacking does not take into consideration, because, as we saw, the notion of communication was central to his approach. In a paper published in 1990, "Transcultural communication and the biology of music", he writes that:
There remain two basic explanations of transcultural musical communication and the diffusion of musical characteristics: 1) different individuals are happy to make sense of the same sounds according to their own, developed musical intuition, and 2) there are biologically based capabilities that enable people to make culture-free, aesthetic judgments. It is only in the second type of situation that there is a possibility that two different individuals might experience the same musical sounds in exactly the same way. (Imberty, 1990: 185) Blacking admitted therefore the possibility of aesthetic judgments which are independent of cultural conditioning and which, rooted in biology, could create an authentic communication link between individuals belonging to different cultures, even one's which are very distant from each other. Here, as you can see, he was opening the Pandora's Box which is the question of universals of the Beautiful, that I'm sure no one was expecting to hear from someone like Blacking. His position can be explained by the fact that, since he was essentially preoccupied by the values and meanings shared inside a single social group, and also by the role of music in fostering a universal brotherhood and fellow feeling, there had to be, for Blacking, universals which would allow communication not only inside a single group, but also between different cultural communities. At the end of his life, he wrote the following: I do not need any acquaintance with Austrian language and culture to enjoy the music of Mozart and Schubert, and even to be able to play it intelligently. Aesthetic communication can therefore provide an alternative, non-rational, nonconceptual source of human sociability, which can have unexpected consequences for social action. (Imberty, 1990: 188) Therefore, he only considered profoundly universal, those traits which contribute to this intercultural communication. That being said, Blacking was a victim, like many musicologists, and many researchers in the humanities generally, of what I like to call 'the fallacy of communication' which I have emphasized in my work, through recourse to the tripartite model of musical semiotics (cf. Nattiez, 1987 Nattiez, , 1993 .
From the moment that we consider a piece or a musical work, not as a monolithic block, but as an ensemble of parameters and constituent parts arranged in a hierarchy, and in which each has a certain autonomy of operation, the question of communication between producers of music from one culture, and receivers of the same music situated in another culture, can no longer be posed in the way that Blacking expresses it. What must be done is, for each of these parameters, to find out whether, yes or no, the strategies of reception are effectively analogous to the strategies of production. The reason that I am able to appreciate a piece of Javanese Gamelan music, or a piece played on the Shakuhachi, is probably that since it is made up of discrete pitches and rhythms which are not completely foreign to me, I grasp something in these musics which is the same for me as for the performer. Naturally, at other levels, I don't understand this music: for example, the relationship between the pitches in a pentatonic system with which, Debussy notwithstanding, I am not terrible familiar. The same is true when I listen to a disk of polyphonic or polyrhythmic pieces of the Banda Linda or of the Baganda. While I am capable of appreciating them, I obviously do not hear the model which serves as the basis for what the musicians play, and which Simha Arom (1985) has taught us to discover and to analyse. But it would be an error to believe that in order to appreciate some musical output which sounds foreign to my ears, there must exist communication on all levels of musical structure, based on analogous emic categories, that is, which have the same cognitive resonance for me as for the indigenous performers or listeners. Precisely because, from the point of view of the relationship between producers and receivers of music, musical 'communication' functions in different ways, depending on which level and which constituent parts of a piece or a work we are talking about. To take a diametrically opposed position to Blacking, I would state that on the contrary, very often the pleasure we experience in listening to the music of a culture which is partially or totally foreign to us, is based on a misinterpretation. But there must be something which is being transmitted of their musical production to my ears, whereas, when I hear Japanese spoken, I understand nothing. On the other hand, if I hear a piece played on the shamisen, or a Bagandan drummer, I can be fascinated by the melodic modulations, the textures, the specific way in which time is treated, the virtuosic ability, the intensity of the sound, etc., and I can take pleasure in listening to it. What must be kept in mind is that, in a musical piece, not all of the component parts are transmitted from the producer to the listener of a different culture. Also, I agree totally with Mantle Hood when he writes:
Close observation of Western and non-Western students and many audiences, all of whom have been in contact with a number of different foreign musical languages, has convinced me and a good many others that (…) persons of different ethnic backgrounds are able to perceive a given musical expression at different levels; that some kind of "musical "meaning" seems not to depend on membership in the society carrying in the tradition; and that the degrees and kind of "musical meaning" may be the same, may be similar, or may be different for members and nonmembers of that society. (1963: 288; my underlying) We all have experienced situations of this kind, and that is at least one reason for which we should, with confidence, get back to searching for musical universals. There's lots of work ahead. We could begin by devising tests which would verify, in the field, whether the universals put forward by musicologists and cognitive scientists as a result of their observation of tonal music, are relevant for non-European musics. I have in mind here the claim made by Lerdahl and Jackendorff according to whom only fourteen of the seventy-five rules for the perceptive analysis of tonal music are 'idiom specific ' (1983: 345-352) . I am also thinking of the rules describing the way in which melody functions, laid out in the third part of Baroni, Dalmonte and Jacoboni's book, Le regole della musica (1999), also available in English. In this book, rules elaborated in the description of the melodic style of Legrenzi were tested against European music, from Gregorian chants all the way to Debussy. There's no reason to stop in the middle of such a promising path. Ethnomusicology should try to test these rules in a gamelan piece or in a Pygmy song. * In closing, I would like to return to the question I asked in the title of this article: "Is the search for universals incompatible with the study of cultural specificity?". In order to do this, I'd like to begin by emphasizing that we shouldn't put the emic and the etic approaches into opposition. Some etic approaches, in particular those which make use of the recognition of universal cognitive mechanisms, are absolutely legitimate. We also need an etic framework of comparison in order to better grasp the specificity of musical cultures, and to compare them to the constitutive elements of music which are defined emically before-hand. There are cases, as we have seen, in which it is legitimate to search for universals while staying on the level of substance. Finally, we must underscore, and this is crucial, that there is no reason to think that the explanation by universals is incompatible with the cultural explanation. To be exact, the two explanations are only incompatible if, a priori, we consider them mutually exclusive. Blacking observed in some of the music of the Nande a movement away from, and then towards a tonal centre (1973: 17) . Culturally, this movement can be explained by the physical experience which consists in the stopping of holes on a flute with the fingers. Of course, Blacking is right to emphasize that, for this reason, the musician's gestures have specific meanings, and the ethnomusicologist is obliged to record and to explain this phenomenon. But this does not prevent him in the slightest from considering that in acting this way, the Nande are obeying a universal Gestaltist law which governs the alternation of repose, tension, repose.
For the ethnomusicologist of tomorrow, I would plead in favour of a well-thought-out reconciliation of the universal and the relative, of the innate and the acquired, of nature and culture, which is what Blacking, if we read him correctly, has in mind for us. However, will we all be capable of a similar ecumenism? If we are, we will have truly answered the question: "How Musical is Man?".
